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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

The Internet, with the speed of its dramatic growth, is considered “an explosive
economic growth opportunity that will redefine global commerce in the information
age.”1 This revolutionary technology presents consumers with an “extraordinary new
means to purchase both innovative and traditional goods and services, to communicate
more effectively, and to tap into rich sources of information that previously were difficult
to access and that now can be used to make better-informed decisions.”2 Today, millions
of people access the Internet daily and many have purchased products, services, or
information online.
The growth of e-commerce, however, requires consumer confidence, and privacy is
a key requirement in building online consumer confidence. An increasing number of
consumers are concerned with how their personal information is used in the electronic
marketplace, and many consumers would rather forgo web-provided information and
products than provide a website their personal information without knowing that site’s
information practices.3 According to the results of a Business Week survey released in
1998, consumers not currently using the Internet ranked concerns about personal
information and communication privacy as the foremost reason they have stayed off the
Internet.4 These findings suggest that effective and meaningful consumer privacy
protections need to be implemented if the electronic marketplace is to grow significantly.
Otherwise, consumers will “remain wary of engaging in electronic commerce, and this
new marketplace will fail to reach its full potential.”5

*

J.D. candidate, Class of 2004, Northwestern University School of Law; Ph.D. candidate, Department
of Communication Studies, Northwestern University.
1
Privacy Alliance, Before the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer
Protection of the Committee on Commerce Hearing on Online Privacy: Testimony of Ms. Christine Varney
on Behalf of the Online Privacy Alliance, 2 (Jul. 21, 1998), available at
http://www.privacyalliance.org/resources/Varney_July_21.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2004).
2
Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on “Consumer Privacy on the World Wide
Web” before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection of the House
Committee on Commerce (1998) (statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/07/privac98.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2004) [hereinafter Prepared
Statement of the Federal Trade Commission].
3
Louis Harris and Associates, Inc. and Dr. Alan F. Westin, Commerce, Communications, and Privacy
Online, A National Survey of Computer Users, 20-21 (1997).
4
Business Week/Harris Poll: Online Insecurity, BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 16, 1998, at 102.
5
See Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, supra note 2.
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While the significance of privacy protection has been generally recognized, there
have been broad differences among how various nations’ governments formulate and
implement their privacy policies and practices. Differing definitions of “privacy” have
led to numerous and often inconsistent legislative schemes aiming to protect online
privacy. These inconsistencies may result in conflicts among governments, and create
barriers for international trade in general and e-commerce in particular.
On July 25, 1995, the European Union’s Council of Ministers (“E.U. Council”)
formally adopted the European Union Privacy Directive (“Directive”).6 Since it became
effective on October 25, 1998, the Directive has become a major concern for U.S.
companies attempting to interact with existing or potential customers and employees in
the European Union (“E.U.”). This concern stems from the Directive’s requirements that
non-E.U.-based companies’ privacy practices either qualify for a “Safe Harbor,” or reach
individual compromises with each E.U. country from which data will be extracted. These
requirements have not only placed additional costs on the U.S. companies, but also
placed these companies at a competitive disadvantage. The Directive also raises
significant privacy policy issues for the U.S. government, whose privacy practices are
more lax, resulting in rounds of negotiation between the U.S. Department of Commerce
(“DOC”) and the European Union in order to address these policy concerns.
This perspective focuses on the impact of this important E.U. document on U.S.
commerce practices, both public and private. In particular, the perspective uses a
comparative approach to study the Directive and the policy issues it imposes on the
United States. In doing so, this perspective first describes the policy concerns underlying
the Directive and the means by which these concerns are addressed. Next, this
perspective identifies specific problems facing the United States as a result of the
Directive and discusses reasons why the United States is unwilling or unable to formally
adopt a privacy policy such as that reflected in the Directive. Finally, this perspective
examines the Safe Harbor agreement that the U.S. government has formulated and
adopted in reaction to the Directive, as well as the effectiveness of the Safe Harbor and
its future in light of the recent changes in U.S. and E.U. privacy policies.
II. THE EUROPEAN APPROACH TO PRIVACY PROTECTION

¶6

When enacted in 1995, the Directive was widely considered the “most important
international development in data protection in the last decade.”7 Its comprehensive
public policy approach is based upon “the premise that privacy is a human right and data
protection is an essential means to protect that right through a coherent and enforceable
legal regime.”8 As early as 1981, the Council of Europe opened for signature and
ratification a data privacy treaty intended “to secure in the territory of each Party for
6

Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data, OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES OF 23 NOVEMBER 1995 NO L. 281, 31, available
at http://www.cdt.org/privacy/eudirective/EU_Directive_.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2004) [hereinafter EU
Directive].
7
Graham Greenleaf, The European Privacy Directive—Completed, 2 PRIVACY L. & POLICY REP. 81
(1995), available at http://austlii.edu.au/~graham/PLPR_EU_1.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2004).
8
Graham Pearce & Nicholas Platten, Orchestrating Transatlantic Approaches to Personal Data
Protection: A European Perspective, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 2024, 2026 (1999).
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every individual, whatever his nationality or residence, respect for his rights and
fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy, with regard to automatic
processing of personal data.”9 This rhetoric is clearly reflected in the Directive. Article 1
of the Directive dictates that “Member States shall protect the fundamental rights and
freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right of privacy, with respect to the
processing of personal data.”10 The Directive thus responds to the European Union’s
need to harmonize the previously fragmented European national data protection laws
within the E.U. Internal Market, where the development of international networks
brought about an enormous increase in cross-border data flows.11
Generally, the Directive has two overall objectives: (1) the protection of
information privacy by Member States of the European Union;12 and (2) the prevention of
restrictions on the free flow of personal information among E.U. Member States, for
reasons of privacy protection.13 In other words, by establishing a clear and stable
regulatory framework that requires a uniform minimum standard of privacy protection
across the European Union, the Directive aims to ensure both a high level of protection
for the privacy of individuals in all Member States and the free movement of personal
data within the European Union.
In order to realize these two objectives, the Directive comprises a mixture of
obligations for data processors who control personal data processing, together with the
enforcement of individuals’ rights for those who are the subject of data processing.
These are reflected in a set of information privacy principles set out in Chapter II
(General Rules on the Lawfulness of the Processing of Personal Data) of the Directive.
These principles cover four general areas of concern: (1) data quality, (2) legitimate
processing, (3) rights of data subject and (4) security of data. The first principle, data
quality, has five specific requirements:
(1) Fairness/Lawfulness: Personal data must be “processed fairly and lawfully;”14
(2) Purpose Limitation: Personal data must be “collected for specified, explicit
and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with
those purposes;”15
(3) Relevance: Personal data must be “adequate, relevant and not excessive in
relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or for which they are
further processed;”16
(4) Accuracy: Personal data must be “accurate and, where necessary, kept up to
date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data which are
inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the purposes for which they are

9

Convention for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data, 20
I.L.M. 317, 317 (1981).
10
EU Directive, supra note 6, at art. 1(1).
11
Pearce & Platten, supra note 8.
12
EU Directive, supra note 6, at art. 1(1).
13
Id. at art. 1(2).
14
Id. at art. 6(1)(a).
15
Id. at art. 6(1)(b).
16
Id. at art. 6(1)(c).
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collected or for which they are further processed, are erased or rectified;”17
and
(5) Timeliness: Personal data must be “kept in a form which permits
identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes
for which the data were collected or for which they are further processed.”18
The second principle, concerning the legitimate processing of personal data, has six
requirements:
(1) Consent: Personal data may be processed only if “the data subject has given
his consent unambiguously;”19
(2) Contract: Personal data may be processed only if “processing is necessary for
the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to
take steps at the request of the data subject entering the contract;”20
(3) Legal Obligation: Personal data may be processed if “processing is necessary
for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject;”21
(4) Vital Interest: Personal data may be processed if “processing is necessary in
order to protect the vital interest of the data subject;”22
(5) Public Interest/Official Authority: Personal data may be processed if
“processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the
public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller
or in the third party to whom the data are disclosed;”23
(6) Legitimate Interest: Personal data may be processed if processing is
“necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by the controller
or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where
such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and
freedoms of the data subject which require protection under Article 1(1).”24
The third principle pertains to rights of the data subject, the person whose personal data is
collected and transmitted. This principle secures three rights:
(1) Right of Access: Every data subject has the right to obtain from the controller
“confirmation as to whether or not data relating to him are processed and
information at least as to the purposes of the processing, the categories of
data concerned, and the recipients or categories of recipients to whom the
data are disclosed;”25
(2) Right to Correct/Block Information: Every data subject has the right to obtain
from the controller “the rectification, erasure, or blocking of data, the
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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Id. at art. 7(e).
Id. at art. 7(f).
Id. at art. 12(1).
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processing of which does not comply with the provisions of this Directive, in
particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data;”26
(3) Right to Object: Every data subject has the right “to object at any time on
compelling legitimate grounds relating to his particular situation to the
processing of data relating to him.”27
The final principle concerns the security of the collected or transmitted personal data.
The Directive requires Member States to “implement appropriate technical and
organizational measures to protect personal data against accidental or unlawful
destruction or accidental loss and against unauthorized alteration, disclosure or access.”28
The “appropriate” level of security is determined by balancing the nature of the data
against the amount of risk involved in the processing of that data.29
¶10
The Directive specifies various mechanisms that aid in the implementation of these
privacy principles. It requires that each Member State enact legislation to fully address
and implement the Directive’s four information privacy principles.30 Further, each E.U.
Member State must establish one or more public authorities to oversee and enforce
privacy protections. These supervisory authorities should “act with complete
independence,” and must have investigative powers, “effective powers of intervention” in
processing, and the power to take court action where national legislation implementing
the Directive is infringed.31
¶11
The Directive also grants individual rights of enforcement. The Directive requires
that individuals be granted the right to seek a judicial remedy for any breach of a Member
State’s national law regarding information privacy,32 as well as a right to recover
compensatory damages.33 Dissuasive penalties for breach of national laws, akin to
punitive damages, are also a required right for individuals, if applicable and appropriate.34
¶12
The Directive also encourages the formulation of codes of conduct for private selfregulation. The national supervising authorities of Member States are to issue opinions
and make provisions for trade associations and other bodies as to whether they comply
with national laws and the Directive.35 In addition, the Directive establishes a supranational administrative supervision of Member States. The supervision is distributed
between three bodies: (1) the E.U. Commission; (2) a Committee of representatives of
E.U. Member States (and in some circumstances, the E.U. Council itself); and (3) an
advisory working party of the national data protection authorities. These supervisory
bodies are responsible for monitoring Member States, recommending implementation
measures, and administering opinions on the level of protection in the E.U. and in other
countries.36
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Id. at art. 12(2).
Id. at art. 14(a).
Id. at art. 17(1) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at art. 32.
Id. at art. 28.
Id. at art. 22.
Id. at art. 23.
Id. at art. 24.
Id. at art. 27.
Greenleaf, supra note 7.
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III. THE IMPACT OF THE DIRECTIVE ON THE UNITED STATES
¶13

The adoption and implementation of the E.U. Privacy Directive has brought about
serious challenges for the United States. While both the United States and the European
Union claim to be committed to safeguarding personal privacy, significant differences are
apparent in terms of how this goal is to be achieved. This uncertainty has increased
concerns among the U.S. business community about the impact of the Directive. Most of
these concerns focus on Article 25 of the Directive, which prohibits data transfers to any
country lacking an adequate level of protection, unless certain tightly defined exemptions
apply.37 This provision reflects the Directive’s intention to ensure that the high level of
protection within E.U. borders is not circumvented in cases where personal data
originally collected or stored in one of Member States is processed or transmitted outside
the European Union.
¶14
In the European Union’s opinion, the United States does not meet the Directive’s
standards for the protection of privacy.38 The prospect of U.S. businesses having to await
the verdict of an E.U. regulatory body before being considered safe destinations for
personal data transmission has led to suggestions that the European Union is attempting
to enforce its model of data protection extraterritorially.39 The U.S. business community
has claimed that the Directive, if it is strictly enforced, may significantly disrupt transAtlantic trade and business planning, as well as impede the development of ecommerce.40
¶15
There are many examples of how this disruption of business may be manifested.
For instance, a U.S. credit card company may be unable to process the financial profile of
a German customer in its Chicago data processing facility. Alternatively, the purchase by
a U.K. customer from the U.S.-based Amazon.com may not be completed because the
customer’s personal data may not be permitted to be transferred to the online retailer’s
website. Likewise, a U.S.-based firm will have problems trying to transfer the records of
its French employee back to its New York headquarters. Similar complications will arise
in various other sectors of industry where personal data is gathered, processed, and
distributed transatlantically. This would include the press, educational institutions,
telephone networks, health care, airlines, directing marketing, online retailers, and
banking.41
IV. THE U.S. APPROACH: WHY THE DIFFERENCE?
¶16

While the European Union and the United States both claim to be committed to
safeguarding personal privacy, there are fundamental differences between the two in
terms of how to achieve this goal. The United States’ unwillingness (or inability) to
37

EU Directive, supra note 6, at art. 25 (emphasis added).
Domingo Tan, Personal Privacy in the Information Age: Comparison of Internet Data Protection
Regulations in the United States and the European Union, 21 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 661, 680
(1999).
39
See, e.g., Simon Davies, Europe to U.S., No Privacy, No Trade, WIRED 6.05, May 1998, at
http://www.wired.com/wired/6.05/europe.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
40
See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, U.S. Twitchy on EU Data Privacy, WIRED NEWS, Oct. 16, 1998,
available at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,15671,00.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
41
Id.
38
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formally adopt a privacy policy such as that reflected in the E.U. Directive can be
attributed to several factors.
¶17
First, a cultural and historical difference between the United States and the
European Union reveal different attitudes about the role of government regulation. In
general, E.U. Member States have a much greater confidence in public institutions and
dependence upon administrative law than does the United States.42 Historically, the
United States has been reluctant to regulate privacy and has no institutional mechanism
solely responsible for privacy protection. Early efforts of privacy advocates in the United
States were adamantly rejected by the majority of legislators. For instance, in the early
1970s, congressional sponsors of privacy legislation, led by Senator Samuel Ervin, Jr. of
North Carolina, attempted to establish an oversight agency to monitor federal agencies’
collection and use of personal information.43 Opposition to these proposals came from
various sources. For example, the interdisciplinary committee that reported to the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare doubted that “the need exists or that the
necessary public support could be marshaled at the present time for an agency of the
scale and pervasiveness required to regulate all automated personal data systems.”44 The
committee believed that privacy safeguards “require the establishment of no new
mechanisms and seek to impose no new constraints on the application of electronic data
processing technology beyond those necessary to assure the maintenance of reasonable
standards of personal privacy in record-keeping.”45
¶18
The United States has rejected all attempts to create a comprehensive set of privacy
standards. Instead, Congress adopted a piecemeal approach, through narrow legislation,
scattered in some specific target areas. Congress and some state legislatures have enacted
isolated statutes such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act46 and the Video Privacy Protection
Act.47 These legislative efforts only happened after the discovery of particularly
scandalous practices (e.g., the use of private information to defame a political figure) and
only cover the particular activities committed by specific actors, such as consumer credit
reporting agencies or video rental service providers, respectively.
¶19
Furthermore, the courts have not broadly recognized a right to privacy in
information held by third parties. In United States v. Miller, 48 the Supreme Court held
that an individual has no Fourth Amendment interest to assert when the government
demands access to the records an organization maintains about him or her (in Miller,
bank records). An individual’s expectation of privacy for records held by any third party
is not legitimate, warranted or enforceable under the Constitution. Miller reduced (and
possibly eliminated) judicial enforcement of the implementation of any privacy act.

42

See COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN EUROPE
AND THE UNITED STATES (Cornell University Press 1992).

43
Id.; see also Harold C. Relyea, The Privacy Act: Emerging Issues and Related Legislation, CRS
Report RL 30824, (Feb. 26, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL30824.pdf (last visited Feb. 1,
2004).
44
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated
Personal Data Systems, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS, 43 (1973).
45
Id.
46
15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (1970).
47
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2710-2711 (1994).
48
425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976).
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Second, the lack of external institutional control on privacy issues reflects the
central U.S. model for fair information policy implementation: voluntary compliance and
self-help. This model is built upon “the philosophy that self-regulation will accomplish
the most meaningful protection of privacy without government interference, and with the
greatest flexibility for dynamically developing technologies.”49 The theory holds that the
“marketplace will protect privacy because the fair treatment of personal information is
valuable to consumers; in other words, industry will seek to protect personal information
in order to gain consumer confidence and maximize profits.”50 In The Framework for
Global Electronic Commerce (known as the “Magaziner Report”), the White House
stated that “the administration supports private sector efforts now underway to implement
meaningful, consumer-friendly, self-regulatory privacy regimes.”51 It also states that “we
believe that private efforts of industry working in cooperation with consumer groups are
preferable to government regulation.”52 The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)
acknowledged the same concern in its privacy report to Congress in 1998. The FTC
reported that “self-regulation is the least intrusive and most efficient means to ensure fair
information practices, given the rapidly evolving nature of the Internet and computer
technology.”53
¶21
Finally, the American approach to privacy protection is driven by business
interests, as compared to the E.U.’s rights-based approach. One commentator noted that
“in effect, the Magaziner Report catered to the industry of personal data rather than
enshrining the participation of citizens’ participation in decision about their personal
data.”54 Indeed, the marketplace of personal information is big business in the United
States. For example, going back to 1998, the gross annual revenue of companies selling
personal information and profiles, largely without the knowledge or consent of the
individuals concerned, was reported US$1.5 billion.55
¶22
The United States’ unwillingness or inability to adopt a formal, comprehensive
privacy policy akin to the Directive reflects significant cultural, historical, legislative and
regulatory differences between the U.S. and the E.U. How to find compromise and
formulate a mutually beneficial privacy policy remains a significant challenge to U.S.
regulators, businesses and policy-makers. These efforts have already begun, as
evidenced by the creation of the Safe Harbor.
V. THE UNITED STATES REACTS: THE SAFE HARBOR
¶23

Since the adoption of the Directive in 1998, the U.S. government has engaged in
intense negotiations with the European Union in order to resolve their privacy policy

49
Joel Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
771, 774 (1999).
50
Id.
51
The White House, A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce (Jul. 1, 1997), at
http://www.technology.gov/digeconomy/framewrk.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2004).
52
Id.
53
Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress (Jun. 1998), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/toc.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2004).
54
Reidenberg, supra note 49, at 775.
55
Id.
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discrepancies. On November 1, 2000, the fruits of these negotiations, a Safe Harbor
agreement, went into effect.56
¶24
Under the Safe Harbor agreement, a U.S. company soliciting personal data from the
European Union must abide by the following seven criteria in order to receive the E.U.
data: Notice, Choice, Onward Transfer, Access, Security, Data Integrity and
Enforcement.57 These criteria are based largely upon the Fair Information Practices
principles developed by the Federal Trade Commission over the past three decades.58
Details of these criteria are as follows:
(1) Notice: Organizations must notify individuals about the purposes for which
they collect and use their personal information. Organizations must provide
information on how individuals may contact the organization with inquiries
or complaints, the types of third parties to which it discloses the personal
information and the choices and means the organization offers for limiting
the use and disclosure of the information.59
(2) Choice: Organizations must give individuals the opportunity to “opt out”—to
choose whether their personal information will be disclosed to a third party or
used for a purpose incompatible with the purpose for which it was originally
collected or subsequently authorized by that individual. For sensitive
information, an affirmative or explicit “opt in” choice must be given to the
individual if their information is to be disclosed to a third party or used for a
purpose other than its original or authorized purpose.60
(3) Onward Transfer (Transfers to Third Parties): In order to disclose
information to a third party, organizations must apply the Notice and Choice
principles (above). Where an organization wishes to transfer information to a
third party that is acting as an agent, it may do so if it knows that the third
party subscribes to the Safe Harbor principles or is subject to the Directive or
other ‘adequacy’ finding. As an alternative, the organization may enter into a
56
U.S. Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor, at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor (last visited Jan.
25, 2004).
57
Id.
58
Angela Vitale, The EU Privacy Directive and the Regulating Safe Harbor: the Negative Effects on
U.S. Legislation concerning Privacy on the Internet, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 321, 338 (2002).
59
Safe Harbor, supra note 56.
60
The Department of Commerce does not define what “sensitive information” is, and an organization
does not always have to provide opt in choice with respect to sensitive data. According to the DOC, such
choice is not required where the processing is:
1) In the vital interests of the data subject or another person;
2) Necessary for the establishment of legal claims or defenses;
3) Required to provide medical care or diagnosis;
4) Carried out in the course of legitimate activities by a foundation, association or any other nonprofit body with a political, philosophical, religious or trade-union aim and on condition that the
processing relates solely to the members of the body or to the persons who have regular contact
with it in connection with its purposes and that the data are not disclosed to a third party
without the consent of the data subjects;
5) Necessary to carry out the organization’s obligations in the field of employment law; or
6) Related to data that are manifestly made public by the individual.
Department of Commerce, FAQ 1: Sensitive Data, at
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/FAQ1sensitivedataFINAL.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2004).
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written agreement with such third party requiring that the third party provide
at least the same level of privacy protection as is required by the relevant
principles.61
Access: Individuals must have access to personal information about them that
an organization holds and must be able to correct, amend, or delete that
information where it is inaccurate—except where the burden or expense of
providing access would be disproportionate to the risks to the individual’s
privacy, or where the rights of other persons would be violated.62
Security: Organizations must take reasonable precautions to protect personal
information from loss, misuse and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration
and destruction.63
Data Integrity: Personal information stored or transmitted must be relevant to
the purposes for which it is to be used. An organization should take
reasonable steps to ensure that data is reliable for its intended use, accurate,
complete and current.64
Enforcement: In order to ensure compliance with the Safe Harbor principles,
organizations must have:
(a) readily available and affordable independent recourse mechanisms so
that individuals’ complaints and disputes can be investigated and
resolved and damages awarded under applicable law or private sector
initiatives;
(b) procedures for verifying that the commitments companies make to
individuals adhere to the Safe Harbor principles; and
(c) obligations to remedy problems arising out of a failure to comply with
the Safe Harbor principles.
Furthermore, sanctions must be sufficiently rigorous to ensure compliance by
the organization. Organizations failing to provide annual self-certification
letters will no longer appear in the participants list and will no longer be
assured Safe Harbor benefits.65

The Safe Harbor agreement is followed by entities on a voluntary basis.66 A company
may implement all the restrictions of the Safe Harbor, notify the U.S. Department of
Commerce that the company intends to comply with the Safe Harbor, and publicly
61

Safe Harbor, supra note 56.
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
The private sector is still reluctant to implement the “Safe Harbor” principles. According to an FTC
survey, only twenty percent of websites in the Random Sample that collect personal identifying information
implement, at least in part, all fair information practice principles. See Federal Trade Commission,
Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on “Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices In
the Electronic Marketplace” before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the
United States Senate (May 25, 2000) (statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Federal Trade
Commission), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/testimonyprivacy.htm (last visited Jan. 25,
2004).
62
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declare compliance on its website. Alternatively, a company may develop its own selfregulatory policies, notify the DOC and publicly declare its compliance.67 Finally,
voluntary compliance may be achieved through complying with a “safety seal” program
that notifies the DOC of the company’s participation and ensures compliance.68
VI. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SAFE HARBOR AND ITS FUTURE
¶25

At the time of this writing, the Safe Harbor has been in effect for over three years.
How effectively have the Safe Harbor principles been implemented and enforced? In the
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States has implemented
anti-terrorism measures that enable the federal government to access its citizens’ data
with fewer restrictions. Meanwhile, the European Union has continued tightening up its
privacy regulations, as evidenced by the recent implementation of an “anti-spam” law
requiring companies to get individuals’ consent before sending e-mail, tracking personal
data on websites, or pinpointing callers’ locations via satellite-linked mobile phones.69
How do these policy changes affect the Safe Harbor? This section addresses the
effectiveness of the Safe Harbor implementation and enforcement, and its future in light
of these recent U.S. and E.U. privacy policy developments.
¶26
Whether the Safe Harbor principles70 may be effectively implemented and enforced
has been a concern for both the E.U. and U.S. governments during and after the Safe
Harbor negotiation process. The U.S. DOC recognizes three general limitations on the
application of these principles in the Safe Harbor Preamble. First, adherence to the Safe
Harbor principles may be limited to the extent necessary to meet national security, public
interest, or law enforcement requirements.71 Second, the Safe Harbor principles may not
apply when U.S. law and government regulations create conflicting obligations or
explicit authorizations.72 Third, application of the Safe Harbor principles may be limited
when exceptions are permitted by the Directive or by a Member State’s national law,
such as where the transfer of personal data is necessary to satisfy a contractual obligation
owed by the transferor to an individual.73 Some entities were either cynical about the
Safe Harbor 74 or doubted whether enough U.S. companies would voluntarily comply
with it to make it effective.75
67

Vitale, supra note 58, at 339.
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See infra Section V.
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Id.; see also Covington & Burling, Privacy: The U.S. “Safe Harbors” to the European Union’s
Directive on Data Protection, available at http://www.cov.com/publications/download/oid6151/211.pdf
(last visited Jan. 25, 2004).
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For instance, Evan Hendricks, editor of Privacy Times and a defender of the Directive, thought that
the Safe Harbor was “more political than substantial,” and that the only real solution is to “have adequate
privacy legislation” in the U.S, cited in Declan McCullagh, Safe Harbor is a Lonely Harbor, WIRED NEWS,
Jan. 5, 2001, available at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,41004,00.html (last visited Jan. 25,
2004). The law firm Covington & Burling also expressed its concern that the Safe Harbor may result in
separate rules for EU citizens and the U.S. citizens, respectively. See Safe Harbor, supra note 56.
75
For instance, Andrew Shen, an analyst at the Electronic Privacy Information Center, said, “What
surprised me the most was that the companies, or associations that Commerce had there to talk up safe
68

109

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

[2003

¶27

One indicator of the status of the Safe Harbor implementation is the number of
companies that have voluntarily complied with the Safe Harbor. From its very
beginning, U.S. companies have been reluctant to volunteer. On February 1, 2001, three
months into the program, only twenty companies signed up.76 By May 1, 2001, six
months into the program, the number of companies increased to thirty-nine.77 By October
31, 2001, at the completion of one full year of the program, the certified total was 124.78
The number grew to 225 by August 16, 2002,79 and as of November 22, 2003, the number
of overall companies signed up for the Safe Harbor only stood at 412.80 Although the
number itself does not necessarily tell the effectiveness of the Safe Harbor,81 it is evident
that the Safe Harbor implementation is at least not as effective in scope as it was expected
to be after three years of implementation. Some U.S. officials had expressed hope that
one hundred companies would sign up in the first month, and one thousand within the
first year.82 The current number (412 after three years) is far below that expectation, and
therefore disappointing.
¶28
In February 2002, the E.U. Commission of the European Communities
(“Commission”) issued a staff working paper (“working paper”), which assessed the
effectiveness of the implementation and enforcement of the Safe Harbor principles.83 The
Commission found that as of December 1, 2001, all of the Safe Harbor agreement’s
elements were in place,84 and that it is “expected that Safe Harbor membership will
continue to grow steadily.”85 The Commission also found that “individuals are able to
lodge complaints if they believe their rights are being denied, but few have done so [and]
no complaint so far remains unresolved.”86

harbor were so reluctant to endorse it . . . but it’s very obvious that the U.S. is going to have a hard time
getting companies to sign up for it,” cited in McCullagh, supra note 74.
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Industries, to Stefano Rodota, Chairman of the EU Data Protection Working Party, and Susan Binns,
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2004).
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See Castor, supra note 76, at n.107.
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However, the Commission found that a substantial number of organizations that
have claimed to adhere to the Safe Harbor do not seem to be observing “the expected
degree of transparency as regards their overall commitment or as regards the contents of
their privacy policy.”87 In particular, the Commission found problems with respect to
transparency in three aspects.
First, voluntary statements of adherence to Safe Harbor principles and/or relevant
privacy policies were not systematically visible.88 Companies must register with the
Commerce Department and publicly declare their adherence to the Safe Harbor principles
in order to enjoy the benefits of Safe Harbor.89 For many organizations, no public
statement of adherence to the Safe Harbor principles can be found. For a small number,
even the privacy policy mentioned in the organization’s self-certification could not be
accessed.90 The Commission therefore concluded that these omissions indicate that “Safe
Harbor participants are in some cases falling short of what the texts require, with a
resulting loss of transparency and clarity, in particular vis-à-vis the public in general.”91
Second, it appears that privacy policies adopted by self-certified organizations do
not systematically reflect Safe Harbor principles. The Commission found that “less than
half of organizations post privacy policies that reflect all seven Safe Harbor Principles.”92
This fact alone was “a cause for some concern” by the Commission, as the European
Union’s reading of the Safe Harbor reflects that self-regulating participants must have a
visible privacy policy in conformity with the Safe Harbor principles.93 Failing to
incorporate all seven principles into a privacy policy is an indication that the organization
concerned “may not have understood and may not therefore be meeting the full range of
their Safe Harbor obligations.”94
Third, the Commission found that in many cases there was a lack of “clarity for
individuals who might wish to exercise their rights vis-à-vis data about them held by an
organization in the Safe Harbor.”95 Some organizations chose dispute resolution bodies,
but did not reveal the contact information of these bodies to individuals, while others
failed to inform individuals of the procedure of making complaints. Other organizations
have multiple privacy policies but do not give clear guidance to individuals on which
polices would apply to them. In short, there is a possibility that individuals “may not
know what rules apply to the processing of their data, or how they can exercise their
legitimate rights.”96
The Commission also found problems with respect to the enforcement of the Safe
Harbor provisions. The Commission acknowledged that there are a wide variety of
87
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sanctions available to enforce Safe Harbor rules under dispute resolution mechanisms.
However, it noticed that “not all dispute resolution mechanisms have indicated publicly
their intention to enforce Safe Harbor rules and not all have in place privacy practices
applicable to themselves that are in conformity with the Principles, as required by Safe
Harbor rules.”97 This type of practice is inconsistent with the requirements of the DOC’s
“Frequently Asked Question number 11,” which explains that Safe Harbor participants
are required to choose dispute resolution bodies that provide individuals with full and
readily available information about how the dispute resolution procedure works when
individuals file a complaint, and that the dispute resolution mechanism’s privacy
practices conform to Safe Harbor principles. In other words, although enforcement is a
key element in the Safe Harbor framework, if the enforcement bodies themselves do not
conform to the Safe Harbor rules, it is hard (and hypocritical) to enforce the same rules
for others. 98
¶34
The E.U. working paper provides a comprehensive review of the Safe Harbor’s
effectiveness. Particularly, it identifies problems with regard to transparency and
enforcement, two vital elements in the Safe Harbor’s self-regulatory framework. In light
of the E.U. assessment’s findings, there are some doubts regarding the level of the
effectiveness of the Safe Harbor’s implementation.99
¶35
Policy developments on both sides of the Atlantic in the past three years also have
had impacts on the Safe Harbor’s effectiveness. On the E.U. side, the European
Parliament and European Council continue to enhance privacy protections. In the United
States, Congress adopted anti-terrorism measures after the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks that created holes in individuals’ control over their personal data and their right to
protect their data’s privacy. These policy developments raise important questions as to
whether the Safe Harbor will continue to be effective and whether the Safe Harbor
principles need to exist at all.
¶36
The E.U. Parliament and the Council of the European Union passed a new
Directive on privacy and electronic communications on July 12, 2002 (“New Directive”),
which went into effect on October 31, 2003.100 This New Directive seeks to ensure an
equivalent level of protection of privacy rights among Member States with respect to
personal data processing in the electronic communication sector and to ensure the free
movement of such data and of electronic communication equipment and services in the
E.U. Community.101 The New Directive has stringent requirements with respect to
personal data processing in electronic communications that go beyond the scope of the
Safe Harbor principles.
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For example, the “anti-spam” provision of the New Directive requires that
unsolicited communications (including communications originative from automatic
calling machines, fax machines, and e-mail) for direct marketing purposes may only be
made to subscribers who have given prior consent—an “opt-in” requirement.102 If this
opt-in requirement is enforced against U.S.-based direct marketing companies, adherence
to Safe Harbor principles will not help these U.S. companies. The Safe Harbor “Choice”
principle allows for both opt-in and opt-out approaches, but if U.S. companies choose the
opt-out approach (a common practice of direct marketing businesses), they are in
violation of the New Directive and subject to E.U. sanctions and/or penalties.
¶38
The impact of these new requirements on the Safe Harbor’s effectiveness is
significant, as the scope of the Safe Harbor framework may be expanded beyond what
was intended by the European Union and the United States in their original negotiations.
A potential consequence would be that an additional burden is imposed on U.S.
companies involved in trans-Atlantic business transactions, forcing them to assume
additional and more stringent requirements. The Safe Harbor framework never intended
such a consequence, but rather was developed to address the “adequacy” requirements of
the 1995 Directive.103 If the European Union continues to pass new and stricter privacy
protection rules that are to be strictly enforced against the U.S. companies, the purpose of
the Safe Harbor will be defeated, and the Safe Harbor framework may be rendered moot.
Already, some U.S. companies have chosen to bypass the Safe Harbor and instead have
adopted E.U.-style policies and practices.104
¶39
On the other hand, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States
profoundly changed the way the U.S. government handles data protection. Today,
Washington is less willing to protect data than it used to be. During the Clinton
administration (1992-2000), a Chief Counselor for Privacy position was housed within
the United States Office of Management and Budget.105 President George W. Bush
dissolved the post upon taking office.106 Now, the United States’ top privacy officer is
affiliated with the Department of Homeland Security.107 Through the enactments of new
laws and new offices, the government now has more unfettered access to a citizens’ data
than ever before. It is therefore not surprising that the American anti-terrorism measures
clash dramatically with European privacy laws.
¶40
A key area where such a clash occurs is related to airline Passenger Name Record
(“PNR”) data. The U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (“CBP,” formerly the
U.S. Customs Service) and the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”), pursuant
to relevant federal statutes, require that foreign airlines flying into U.S. territory transfer
to the U.S. administration personal data relating to the passengers and crew members
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flying to or from the United States.108 Such personal data clearly falls within the
protection of the 1995 Directive. Hence, any transfer of this type of data has to be made
in the presence of adequate safeguards afforded by the U.S. authorities.109 The United
States tries to address concerns regarding PNR protection and its policy framework in
Undertakings of the United States Bureau of the Customs and Border Protection and the
United States Transportation Security Administration (“Undertakings”).110 Specifically,
Undertakings addresses issues such as the use, treatment, and protection of PNR data by
the CBP and the TSA, the treatment of sensitive data, the storage and the methods of
accessing PNR data, the CBP and TSA computer system security, compliance, and the
transfer of PNR data to other government authorities.111 The United States hopes that the
Undertakings will satisfy the requirements of the Directive or the Safe Harbor principles.
¶41
However, in a recent speech to the European Parliament Committee on Citizens’
Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs, Frits Bolkestein, E.U. Commission
member in charge of the Internal Market and Taxation, pointed out that the requisite
safeguards for PNR data are not present, and that the current level of privacy protection
over PNR data by U.S. authorities is not adequate.112 Bolkestein identifies four
shortcomings of the current U.S. policy regarding the PNR data. First, the Directive’s
“purpose limitation” is violated because the U.S. government does not want to limit its
use of PNR to the fight against terrorism, but wants to extend its use to “other serious
criminal offenses” and is not prepared to narrow this use further. Second, the “scope of
data required” is not sufficiently narrow: the U.S. government requires thirty-nine
different PNR elements, which is not proportionate to its purpose. Third, the U.S.
government’s data storage periods for PNR are very long (six to seven years) without
adequate reason. Finally, the U.S. government’s undertakings are insufficiently legally
binding to satisfy the Safe Harbor or Directive principles.113
¶42
It is interesting to observe that while the Safe Harbor framework is readily
available and has been a partially effective instrument to facilitate the data flow between
108
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E.U. countries and U.S. entities, the CBP and TSA did not choose to entirely adhere to it
in their Undertakings. Although some elements of the Safe Harbor framework were
addressed in Undertakings (e.g., Notice, Access and Security requirements),114 the Choice
and Enforcement principles are absent from Undertakings. There are two potential
explanations for this policy discrepancy: (1) a lack of collaboration between different
U.S. government agencies (in this case, CBP/TSA and the DOC); and (2) national
security needs simply trump the need for data protection, and the Safe Harbor’s
framework may limit the ability of CBP and TSA to effectively perform their protective
duties.
¶43
The clash between U.S. Homeland Security interests and international privacy
concerns implies that if the United States continues to adopt anti-terrorism measures that
clash with E.U. privacy law, the effectiveness of the Safe Harbor rules may continue to
deteriorate—first by the limited number of signatories and the implementation problems,
then by the limited areas to which the Safe Harbor principles apply. Once again, the
United States and the European Union are currently engaging in negotiation again in
order to come up with a policy framework that compromises the differences of the two
sides. It will be interesting to see whether the missing Safe Harbor principles will be
added to the revised Undertakings.
VII.

CONCLUSION

¶44

The Safe Harbor agreement between the United States and the European Union has
been adopted for over three years at the time of this publication, and it has had dramatic
impacts on privacy policy debate in the United States. There is evidence that U.S.
lawmakers have begun to copy the essence of the Safe Harbor agreement in bills they
propose. For instance, language in proposed legislation115 reflects the objectives of the
Safe Harbor and the Directive.116 In addition, the FTC has begun to change its role in
privacy protection from advocating industry self-regulation to promoting increased
federal regulation. If Safe Harbor principles were mimicked in legislation, the FTC
would have a heightened role in the enforcement of any new legislation because of its
reliance on Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which declares “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” to be illegal.117
¶45
However, the effectiveness of the Safe Harbor has been limited by both the number
of companies electing to join and implementation problems relating to transparency and
enforcement. The Safe Harbor as an international compromise has been further
114
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weakened by the European Union’s passage of a more stringent Directive on data
protection in electronic communication as well as the anti-terrorism measures taken by
the U.S. government after September 11, 2001. In addition, recent research has revealed
that the Safe Harbor agreement has had some unanticipated negative effects on the U.S.
privacy policy.118
There is no doubt that the E.U. privacy model has had profound impacts on the
¶46
U.S. privacy policy formulation. From a civil rights perspective, it is good news that the
U.S. at least is undergoing some pro-E.U. changes in its privacy protection policy.
However, the privacy policy conflicts between the United States and the European Union
will not likely go away. The European Union’s continuing efforts to “beef up” privacy
protection will inevitably clash with the United States’ interests in national security and
protecting its free market. What this will do to the development of e-commerce remains
an issue that only can be resolved in the marketplace. One thing is for certain,
however—a compromising policy framework that addresses the needs of both the
European Union and United States will require innovative ideas and painstaking efforts
by both sides of the Atlantic.
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